I Von Schwarz 21 N-5 (ca 1895) 1900 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Most of the people of Tashkent are Turkic-speaking Sarts, in general exhibiting all the physical and moral traits and characteristics of the Sarts mentioned above, since Tashkent is the actual center of their area of distribution. There are only a few Tadjiks; these have mostly wandered in from Khodzhent/Leninabad and Fergana, and usually stay in Tashkent only temporarily as merchants or workers. Outside of the Sarts and Tajiks, there are in Tashkent only about a hundred Tatars, Kirgiz, and Bukharan Jews, as well as isolated Hindus, Afghans, Persians, Chinese, etc. 162

The male sex visibly predominates over the female, obviously a consequence of polygamy.

5. Political and Social Conditions, past and present.

As has already been mentioned above, at the time Tashkent was taken by the Russians it belonged to the Khanate of Kokand. Of the various Uzbek khanates arising since the beginning of the sixteenth century, only three survived until modern times: the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand. Of these only the first two have today retained a nominal independence, while the third since 1876 has been incorporated into Russia. 642

The political and social arrangements were the same in all the Uzbek khanates. (1) The ruling classes were formed by the Uzbeks, 565 554

1. The short-lived state set up by the Sart Yakub Beg in the Tarym basin was also organized in quite the same way as the Uzbek states of Bukhara, Kokand, Khiva, Kunduz, etc.

from whom the rulers came. But there was and is no real aristocracy. Only the brothers and sons of the actual khan enjoy a privileged position and bear the title 'tyura' or "Sir", a title which is also conferred upon the Russian officials and officers by the natives. This title, like the Kazakh 'sultan', is placed after the personal name. Otherwise only the /175/ mullahs or scholars are held in esteem; but these owe their prominent place solely to their erudition and not at all to their birth, for admission to the schools is open to all, regardless of origin. All other subjects alike, be they Uzbeks, Sarts or Tadjiks, are slaves of their khan, without rights, and he usually treats them all in the most arbitrary manner. Today he can raise a beggar and even a former slave to the highest post of honor, and tomorrow he may make him a beggar [641] 643 554

643 again or even have him executed for no reason at all. Most of the
554 influential figures and high dignitaries at the courts of the khans make many changes in the course of their careers as a result of this and moreover even the khans themselves are not always immune. The former envoy of Kokand, Mirza Hakim, who for the betrayal of his fatherland and his Khan later received the title of a Russian state councillor, had earlier been a shopkeeper. The Khan of Khiva, Kulman, was promoted to this position as a result of a conspiracy of day laborers. The former ruler of Kashgar, Yakub Beg, rose from the dregs of the population, having been in his youth a 'batsha', or 'public dancer.' The last Khan of Kokand, Khudoyar, after his first dethronement in Dzhizak, established himself as a shopkeeper, and acquired such a fancy for business that he continued with it after he regained the throne, and declared a large part of the booths of the bazaar of Kokand to be his property. Indeed he did not consider it beneath his dignity to keep bands of musicians, as well as leaders of bears and monkeys, which he ordered led about the fairs on his account, and had them give concerts in private houses, uninvited.

● 565 Since the post of honor of the father, the bestowal of which unfortunately depended upon the whim of the ruler, was only rarely passed on to his son, the children of high-placed officials often enjoyed no more education than the children of ordinary townsmen and ran around with them barefoot and half-naked in the streets. During my stay of several weeks in Baysun in 1886, where I was the guest of the beg or governor there, the sons of the beg came to my court every day to consume the leftovers of my dinner in the company of my servants and cossacks. To see a former beg or court official or his sons working as dealers in old clothes, carters or even day laborers is not at all unusual.

1043 One can see from the following case how uncertain and in-
558 constant the favor of a khan is. During my first trip to Bukhara, a Bukharan who ranked as the best chess-player was staying with the former Emir of Bukhara, Muzafar al-Din, a chess-player who was as passionate a player as he was mediocre. The chess-player was held in great esteem and was overwhelmed by the Emir with /176/ honors and riches. Upon a later visit I met this favorite in a group of ragged vagabonds who were pushing their way into our quarter with the hope of obtaining some of the tidbits from our table which are usually found when guests are being entertained. When I inquired

788 and have the special right to wear white khalats. The number of pilgrims to Mecca is relatively small in Turkestan as a result of the great distance and the difficulty of communications. Usually these pilgrims make their way across Afghanistan and India, and they usually need one or two years for the journey, during which time a large number of them perish either from cholera or other diseases, or as a result of hardships and privations and attacks by robbers. In more recent times, those in more recent times, those in better circumstances choose a more convenient route across Russia and via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

565 /199/ The alleged descendants of Mohammed, who likewise enjoy a favored position, are designated in Turkestan as 'hodjas'. These are rather numerous, intermarry whenever possible, and therefore constitute a kind of spiritual aristocracy. /Figure 70, p. 40a. Caption: The Gur-Emir mosque with the grave of Tamerlane in Samarkand./ One finds the jodjas in /200/ all possible positions in life, as mullahs (Figure 81, p. 225, p. 59a), tradespeople, craftsmen and peasants. They are probably in reality the descendants of the Arabic conquerors.

741 In addition to the fortuitous gifts bestowed by the believers upon the duvanas, ishans and other religious parasites, their support is also sought through a large number of pious institutions, designated as 'wakf'. By wakf is meant in Moslem countries, all property in mortmain which has been established partly by God-fearing princes, partly by wealthy private individuals for the support of mosques, medreses, cloisters, baths, leper houses, wells, and for poor scholars and students and the like. /Figure 71, p. 40b. Caption: The Hasret mosque in the town of Turkestan./ The wakf property consists partly of landed property, partly of buildings, bazaar booths, caravansaries, mills, etc., and it is managed by special officials, the 'mutevals', who are in charge of the expenditure of the income from the various institutions in accordance with the will of the founder. The wakf institutions are exempt from all taxes and tributes.

[471] When one reflects that, in Turkestan, aside from the constant occasional payments to the duvanas, ishans, and mullahs, a third of the entire land property and national wealth has fallen to the wakf, then one can /201/ easily calculate how great a percentage of the entire population is made up of mullahs, duvanas and ishans, living exclusively at the expense of the working classes, who alone must defray all the state expenditures in addition to this.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

585 Occasionally, refugees indicate, after
177 a formal lay wedding ceremony, the parents of the bride and bridegroom may engage the services of a mullah or another trained person to read in secret the *nikah*, the wedding formula, but this is an exception rather than the rule.

798 As for the *shari'ah* — representing for the Muslims the religious "way
517 of life" — it has been eliminated not only by the Soviet liquidation of
177 native religious courts and the introduction of a single system of justice
518 throughout the Soviet Union, but also by the spontaneous development of Muslim society itself. Even prior to the 1917 Revolution there had emerged among the Central Asian intelligentsia a powerful secular reform movement known as *jadidism* (*dzhadidism*, in Russian transliteration), the followers of which adopted as one of their principal aims the separation of religion and state. The jadidists fought the clerical groups, gathered around the Ulema Dzhemieti (Association of Ulema), with as much fervor as they fought Russian colonial officials and settlers. Indeed, on this basis of a united effort against the religious influence on everyday life, there occurred in the early period of the Soviet regime an alliance between the Communists and left-wing jadidists which lasted until the purges of the 1930's. The desire to transform Central Asia into a modern, secular, Western country — a desire which is as deep-seated in the post-World War II refugee as it was in the pre-1917 jadidist — has as one of its prerequisites the elimination of religion from a position of influence in the everyday life of the Muslim community, and its confinement to the "proper" sphere, that is, ritual. Islam as a way of life has thus been destroyed by the combined pressures of Soviet antireligious policy and the hostility of the native intelligentsia. The trend in the direction of secularization is so distinct as to make a return to the *shari'ah* as unlikely as a return of Western Europe to the medieval theocratic ideal.[3]

771 Without doubt the religious life of the Islamic community in Central
• 565 Asia is stronger among the lower strata of society, among the mountain
517 peoples, and among the elders and women than it is among the groups represented in the interviews. But it is equally certain that the most active elements of society — the adult males, and especially the rural and urban "intelligentsia" — reject religion. A certain measure of religious revival in the event of the return of civic freedom in Central Asia is not unlikely. It may lead to a reopening of the mosques, the reinstitution of Friday prayers, the emergence of mullahs and the introduction of some religious education for the young. But a return to the religious life of the pre-
795 1927–32 period seems entirely out of the question. Islam still survives as
177 a powerful social bond because it serves to differentiate the native from

[3] In this connection it is interesting to note that recently a Constitutional Commission of Pakistan declared that a republic based on the principles of the Qur'an, as desired by the Pakistani ulema, could not be a democratic one, because of the fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy. See *New York Times*, April 24, 1954.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Social contact, too, seems to be limited, even among the groups which by virtue of their occupation are constantly in touch with representatives of other nationalities. Muslim refugees who had been employed in Soviet agencies and offices together with Russians were unanimous in asserting that contact with the Russians ceased after working hours. Much the same seems to be the case among soldiers on active service in peace time.

Russo-Muslim relations vary considerably, depending upon the social status and level of education of the groups concerned. On the whole, the interviews indicate that national friction is in an inverse ratio to social status and education: the higher the status, the less friction. Racial hostility appears strongest among the poorest rural inhabitants, among the plain soldiers, and the unskilled laborers; it seems least prevalent among the intelligentsia, the state and party officials, the well-to-do peasants and workers, and the army officers. By and large the refugees — despite their strong anti-Russian bias — agreed that the relations between Russians and Muslims are good, and they attached little significance to various incidents of national friction which, being prompted, they had been able to recall. There seems to be a deep-seated feeling that whatever the differences dividing them, both these groups suffer from the same regime, that they are "in the same boat."

In the universities, *vuzy*, *tekhnikums*, and other places where work is combined with residence, Muslims and Russians frequently tend to separate from each other on their own initiative. A number of refugees reported that Muslim and Russian students, when given the choice, preferred to live in separate dormitories.

The greatest single Russifying force in the Soviet Union is the army. In the 1920's, in the initial stage of the Soviet nationality policy, the Communists had created separate military divisions for the major nationality groups in the USSR. These units were gradually broken up in the early 1930's, first by withdrawing regiments and battalions from their national commands and dispersing them among other regular Soviet divisions, and then by disbanding their commanding staffs as well. From then until World War II there were no separate national units. At one time in the course of World War II, when Soviet military fortunes were at their nadir, attempts were made to create separate all-Muslim units in Turkestan, possibly to serve as Home Guards. However, as soon as the Soviet army began to gain the initiative at the front, the formation of these units was suspended, and its personnel was eventually dispersed in the regular Red army. Since the 1930's the army has scattered Muslim draftees throughout regular Soviet units in such a manner that no more than a few Muslims are assigned to any one infantry company; Muslim officers, too, are distributed as thinly as possible.

Naturally, such a system does not permit Muslim recruits to maintain

8:Kostenko 157-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
[Kuldja] RL1

361 · 1) Russians

	Males	Females	Total
162 Hereditary nobility	6	4	10
365] Non-hereditary nobility	12		12
Monastic clergy	1		1
Lower middle class	19	7	26
Peasants	9	4	13
Military	714		714
Cossacks	257		257

2) Natives

Taranchi	2,083	1,882	3,905
Dungans	202	206	406
Chinese	976	776	1,752
Other nationalities (1)	370	225	595
Total	4,649	3,044	7,693

1. Here belong Kalmycks, Torgouts, Manchus, Kazakhs, Afghans and Sarts, immigrants from Turkestan and Kashgar.

/435/ The division of the population of Kuldja according to religious belief is as follows:

	Male	Female	Total
Eastern Orthodox	1,013	14	1,027
Catholics	72	71	143
Lutherans	3	-	3
Moslems	2,655	2,253	4,908
Pagans	906	706	1,612
	4,649	3,044	7,693

361 The productivity of Kuldja is not great.
433 The recent troubles and unrest which have torn